Files
bj_power/bj_power_wms/internal/handler/jwt.go
T
SunYF 7b7d27d150 feat: 会话令牌与守卫、看板组件及工位终端功能完善
- 用户表扩展:MES/WMS user 实体新增字段,新增 active_token 迁移 SQL(2026-11-11)
- 会话机制:MES 新增 session_guard,重构 token/auth/jwt/perm 与路由;WMS/工作站同步令牌续签与鉴权
- 看板(board):调整 MES 看板产线/生产/侧栏/仓库组件及样式;WMS 看板展示页同步调整
- 工位终端后端:完善报警流、绑定、PLC 对账、拧紧、proxy、上报、站点告警/操作等 handler,补充 mes client/store
- 工位终端前端:登录/主界面/各操作面板调整,新增滚动分页与多语言 yaml 文案,刷新构建产物
- MES 业务:新增流程链 logic,调整待审核/产能支撑/产品工艺/设置页、PLC 监控与帮助文档,刷新构建产物
- 更新问题记录文档
2026-11-11 14:36:16 +08:00

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package handler
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"bj_power_wms/ent/user"
"bj_power_wms/internal/svc"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4"
)
// JWTClaims 自定义声明
type JWTClaims struct {
UserID int `json:"userId"`
Username string `json:"username"`
RealName string `json:"realName"`
Role string `json:"role"`
// SID 后台登录会话标识(同账号互踢,2026-11-11):后台 login 生成并写入 users.active_token;
// 滑动续签(renewIfNearExpiry)原样保留 SID——不能比对原始 token 串(每请求重签会误踢并发请求)。
SID string `json:"sid,omitempty"`
jwt.RegisteredClaims
}
// sessionExpire 会话闲置窗口(秒),默认 1 小时
func sessionExpire(ctx *svc.ServiceContext) int64 {
if ctx.Config.Auth.AccessExpire > 0 {
return ctx.Config.Auth.AccessExpire
}
return 3600
}
// SignToken 签发 JWT;sid=后台登录会话标识(互踢用,续签时传 claims.SID 原样保留)
func SignToken(ctx *svc.ServiceContext, userID int, username, realName, role, sid string) (string, int64, error) {
expire := sessionExpire(ctx)
exp := time.Now().Add(time.Duration(expire) * time.Second)
claims := &JWTClaims{
UserID: userID,
Username: username,
RealName: realName,
Role: role,
SID: sid,
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(exp),
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
Issuer: "bj_power_wms",
},
}
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
signed, err := token.SignedString([]byte(ctx.Config.Auth.AccessSecret))
return signed, exp.Unix(), err
}
// ParseToken 校验并解析 JWT
func ParseToken(ctx *svc.ServiceContext, tokenStr string) (*JWTClaims, error) {
token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenStr, &JWTClaims{}, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {
if _, ok := t.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
return nil, errors.New("非法签名算法")
}
return []byte(ctx.Config.Auth.AccessSecret), nil
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
claims, okk := token.Claims.(*JWTClaims)
if !okk || !token.Valid {
return nil, errors.New("token 无效")
}
return claims, nil
}
// renewIfNearExpiry 滑动续签:每个携带有效 token 的请求都重签,
// 会话有效期 = 距最后一次请求 sessionExpire 秒(默认 1 小时),闲置超时即 401。
func renewIfNearExpiry(ctx *svc.ServiceContext, w http.ResponseWriter, claims *JWTClaims) {
if time.Until(claims.ExpiresAt.Time) > 0 {
if newToken, _, err := SignToken(ctx, claims.UserID, claims.Username, claims.RealName, claims.Role, claims.SID); err == nil {
w.Header().Set("X-Renewed-Token", newToken)
}
}
}
// authInterceptor 登录鉴权中间件(白名单之外的 /api/* 需要 JWT)
// go-zero rest.Middleware 签名:func(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc
func authInterceptor(ctx *svc.ServiceContext) func(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
path := r.URL.Path
// 白名单:健康检查 / 登录注册 / 免登录大屏 / 内部API(自带写死token校验) / 附件静态文件
// /uploads/* 为附件预览(window.open 新窗口打开,浏览器无法携带 Authorization 头),必须免鉴权。
if path == "/api/health" ||
strings.HasPrefix(path, "/api/auth/") ||
strings.HasPrefix(path, "/api/display/") ||
strings.HasPrefix(path, "/api/internal/") ||
strings.HasPrefix(path, "/uploads/") {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
if authHeader == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") {
failCode(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, 401, "未登录或 token 缺失")
return
}
tokenStr := strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ")
claims, err := ParseToken(ctx, tokenStr)
if err != nil {
failCode(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, 401, "登录已失效,请重新登录")
return
}
// 后台同账号互踢守卫(2026-11-11):JWT 内 SID 与 users.active_token 不一致 → 已被新登录顶掉。
// active_token 为空(存量旧会话/未后台登录过)放行,下次后台登录后生效。
if claims.UserID > 0 {
if u, uerr := ctx.EntClient.User.Query().Where(user.IDEQ(claims.UserID)).Only(ctx0()); uerr == nil &&
u.ActiveToken != "" && u.ActiveToken != claims.SID {
failCode(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, 401, "账号已在其他地方登录,本会话已下线,请重新登录")
return
}
}
renewIfNearExpiry(ctx, w, claims)
r.Header.Set("X-Username", claims.Username)
r.Header.Set("X-Role", claims.Role)
r.Header.Set("X-UserID", strconv.Itoa(claims.UserID))
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// internalTokenInterceptor 项目间 API 写死 token 校验
func internalTokenInterceptor(ctx *svc.ServiceContext) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
expect := ctx.Config.Internal.Token
got := r.Header.Get("X-API-TOKEN")
if expect != "" && got != expect {
failCode(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, 401, "内部接口 token 错误")
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// wrapInternal 组合内部 token 校验与 handler
func wrapInternal(ctx *svc.ServiceContext) func(h http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(h http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
return internalTokenInterceptor(ctx)(h).ServeHTTP
}
}